

2 March 1981

STAT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Chairman, Interagency Working Group on  
Intelligence Production

SUBJECT : Report of Ad Hoc Working Group on  
"Intelligence User Survey"

1. The Ad Hoc Working Group on "Intelligence User Survey" was organized to design a questionnaire to determine the level of usage and satisfaction with intelligence among Carter Administration policy officers. The working group has completed its work. Attached you will find a questionnaire with an instruction sheet, a draft transmittal memo for DCI signature, a proposed list of individuals to be surveyed, and a statement of the goals and procedures for the survey. We would appreciate your Working Group's review of these documents as the first step in obtaining Community-wide acceptance of this undertaking.

2. The attached items have been produced with the assistance and, in most cases, the full acceptance of the various Community members of the Ad Hoc Working Group. The only issue that remains unresolved relates to question 20. It concerns the degree to which policy officers should be asked about their usage of a variety of Agency-specific products. The majority of the group felt that it would be beneficial to know which actual types of publications of different agencies that the policy officer used. The DIA member believes that this questionnaire is not the proper vehicle for conducting a specific product survey. It is DIA's position that such a product survey would be more successfully accomplished as a separate action or as part of follow-up interviews. This is a matter that needs to be resolved by your Working Group.

3. The list of individuals to be surveyed has been discussed in the Ad Hoc Working Group. We believe that the attached list meets the criteria set out in our paper on goals and procedures.

4. Please note that the survey has been designed with the professional assistance of the Psychological Services Division of CIA in order to maximize its validity and utility. We urge you to resist doing arbitrary editing and making changes to the basic design of the questionnaire if possible.

SUBJECT: Report of Ad Hoc Working Group on  
"Intelligence User Survey"

5. Having completed this portion of its task, the Ad Hoc Working Group will await additional guidance before proceeding further.



Chairman  
Ad Hoc Working Group

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typed: 3 Mar 81

(no date)

Mr. Survey Recipient  
Street Address  
City, State, Zip

Dear \_\_\_\_\_:

I want to make the US intelligence product as responsive as possible to policy needs. I ask your help in achieving this goal.

Your experience with the intelligence support you received as a policy officer can add substantially to my understanding of the use of intelligence by policymakers and provide an important contribution to making improvements. Enclosed is a questionnaire that is being distributed to selected former high-level policy officials who were regular recipients of intelligence products. The questionnaire covers a great deal of ground, but it has been designed to place a minimum burden on the respondents. Since the number of participants in this survey is small, it is important that all questionnaires be completed and returned.

You may wish to clarify or expand your unclassified answers to the items on this survey. To this end, a number of follow-up interviews will be scheduled. Please be sure to indicate (in item 31) your desire or willingness to participate in such an interview. Please return your completed questionnaire in the enclosed pre-addressed envelope before (date).

Sincerely,

William J. Casey

Enclosures:

As stated

POLICY OFFICERS' SURVEY ON  
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PRODUCTION

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING QUESTIONNAIRE

The Intelligence Community is jointly undertaking this survey of policy officers from the Administration of President Carter. The purpose of the survey is to gain valuable insight into the areas of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the various products from the Intelligence Community. You have been chosen to participate in the survey because you were a recipient of intelligence reports in your previous position. We are interested in your opinions on the topics covered in the questionnaire. Therefore, please do not delegate a subordinate to complete the questionnaire. A few of the questions are worded to ascertain the utility of intelligence in actual decision making situations. If your superior actually made the decisions but you know how useful the intelligence was, then please answer the question even though you may not have actually made the decisions yourself. If you held more than one position in the Carter Administration, then please use your experience from your last, most recent position.

We know your time is valuable but the questionnaire will not take long to complete. We wish to assure you that in terms of the objectives of this survey, namely, to maximize the utility of intelligence for top-level policymakers, this will be time well spent. The size of our sample is small; therefore, the importance of each response is very high.

There are four open-ended items at the end of the survey and we would be interested in any and all statements you are willing to provide. However, please keep your written responses unclassified, as is the entire questionnaire, in order to facilitate handling. If you wish to pursue a classified matter, be sure to check the box at the end of the questionnaire indicating a desire for a follow-up interview.

When completed, the questionnaire (along with any accompanying text) should be returned prior to \_\_\_\_\_ via the pre-addressed envelope included in this package. Thank you for your time and your help in this matter of substantial importance to us all.

If you have any questions, please contact [redacted] CIA  
Psychological Services Division, telephone [redacted]

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1. How often did you attempt to review intelligence in the execution of your official responsibilities? (Circle one.)
  - a. Always
  - b. Usually
  - c. Occasionally
  - d. Rarely
  - e. Never
  
2. Has intelligence ever directly influenced a policy decision made by you? (Circle one.)
  - a. Often
  - b. Occasionally
  - c. Rarely
  - d. Never
  
3. Did you ever formulate policy with the feeling that you would have benefitted from more or better intelligence? (Circle one.)
  - a. Often
  - b. Sometimes
  - c. Rarely
  - d. Never

If so, briefly state why you think more or better intelligence was not available.

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4. On a daily basis, how much time did you devote to reviewing intelligence? (Circle one.)
  - a. More than 60 minutes
  - b. 31 to 60 minutes
  - c. 16 to 30 minutes
  - d. 5 to 15 minutes
  - e. Less than 5 minutes

5. To what degree did you rely on your staff and/or subordinates to pre-screen the intelligence which you received? (Circle one.)
- a. My staff or subordinates pre-screened all of the intelligence I received.
  - b. My staff or subordinates pre-screened some of the intelligence I received.
  - c. My staff or subordinates pre-screened none of the intelligence I received.
6. In what form did you ordinarily receive intelligence? (Circle all that apply.)
- a. Formal publications or reports.
  - b. Oral presentations from my staff or other members of my department.
  - c. Written presentations from my staff or other members of my department.
  - d. Oral presentations from representatives of another agency (including intelligence agencies).
  - e. Written presentations from representatives of another agency (including intelligence agencies).
  - f. Other (Specify) \_\_\_\_\_.
7. In what form did you usually prefer to receive your intelligence? (Circle one.)
- a. In oral form
  - b. In written form
  - c. In some combination of oral and written forms.
  - d. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_.

8. Below are five commonly-used methods for seeking intelligence. Which of these procedures (if any) did you follow? Enter the appropriate percentage (0-100) in the blank to the left of each -- alternative such that all entries (from a to f) total to 100% .

- ☐ a. Direct contact with Agency heads (e.g., Admiral Turner, General Tighe, or Admiral Inman) or senior-level intelligence officers (e.g., Bruce Clark or General Thompson).
- ☐ b. Direct contact with NIOs/DIOs/SINIOs.
- ☐ c. Direct contact with other intelligence officers.
- ☐ d. Through intelligence liaison.
- ☐ e. Through action (written or telephone) by your staff.
- ☐ f. I did not seek intelligence.

9. Using the four-point scale below, rate how often you did not ask for intelligence information in the categories listed below when, in retrospect, if you had, you might actually have benefitted from the intelligence received.

- 1 = Often
- 2 = Occasionally
- 3 = Rarely
- 4 = Never

- ☐ a. Political
- ☐ b. Economic
- ☐ c. Military
- ☐ d. S & T
- ☐ e. Geographic & Societal
- ☐ f. Energy (including Nuclear)
- ☐ g. Other (Specify)\_\_\_\_\_.

10. Using the same scale as in the preceding question, estimate how often you did not ask for intelligence information in the categories below and, in retrospect, you still wouldn't because you did not feel the Intelligence Community could properly satisfy the requirement.

- ☐ a. Political
- ☐ b. Economic
- ☐ c. Military
- ☐ d. S & T
- ☐ e. Geographic & Societal
- ☐ f. Energy (including Nuclear)
- ☐ g. Other (Specify)\_\_\_\_\_.

11. Using the scale included below, how often did you levy requirements for each of the following categories of requests?

- 1 = Often
- 2 = Occasionally
- 3 = Rarely
- 4 = Never

- ☐ a. Basic information.
- ☐ b. Analysis of a particular issue.
- ☐ c. Current information on a particular issue.
- ☐ d. Additional information on an issue that was covered in an intelligence publication.
- ☐ e. Other (Specify)\_\_\_\_\_.

12. Using the same four-point scale, indicate how frequently you actually levied requests for intelligence on each of the following agencies:

- 1 = Often
- 2 = Occasionally
- 3 = Rarely
- 4 = Never

- ☐ a. State Department
- ☐ b. CIA
- ☐ c. DIA
- ☐ d. NSA
- ☐ e. Army, Navy, or Air Force Intelligence
- ☐ f. Other (Specify)\_\_\_\_\_.

13. Indicate what percentage of your time your policy responsibilities were focused on the areas listed below. The total of your entries should sum to 100%. (See map on page 12)

- ☐ a. Western Europe - NATO countries
  - ☐ b. Soviet-European Communist countries
  - ☐ c. Latin America
  - ☐ d. Middle East - North Africa
  - ☐ e. Sub-Saharan Africa
  - ☐ f. Asia
- 100%

14. Indicate the percentage of your time your policy responsibilities were focused on the subject areas listed below. The total should sum to 100%.

- ☐ a. Political
  - ☐ b. Economic
  - ☐ c. Military
  - ☐ d. Scientific/Technological
  - ☐ e. Geographic/Societal
  - ☐ f. Energy (including Nuclear)
  - ☐ g. Other (Specify) \_\_\_\_\_.
- 100%

15. Using the four-point scale outlined below, rate each of the following topics in terms of their importance to you in the execution of your official duties.

1=Very important  
 2=Somewhat important  
 3=Not particularly important  
 4=Not at all important

- a. Human rights ☐
- b. Nuclear proliferation ☐
- c. Science and technology ☐
- d. International terrorism ☐
- e. Illicit drug traffic ☐

D R A F T

16. Using the same four-point scale, rate the following military topics in terms of their importance to you in the execution of your official duties.

- a. Armed conflict: Hostilities I & W \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Force planning \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Strategic offensive forces \_\_\_\_\_
- d. Strategic defensive forces \_\_\_\_\_
- e. General purpose forces \_\_\_\_\_
- f. Support capabilities and military environment \_\_\_\_\_
- g. Arms transfers \_\_\_\_\_
- h. Military assistance \_\_\_\_\_
- i. Out of country force deployments \_\_\_\_\_
- j. Biographic data \_\_\_\_\_

17. Using the same four-point scale, rate each of the following economic topics in terms of their importance to you in the execution of your official duties.

- a. National economic policies (including International Finance) \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Energy (including Nuclear) \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Resources, Population and Agriculture \_\_\_\_\_
- d. Trade and technology \_\_\_\_\_
- e. Foreign economic relations \_\_\_\_\_
- f. Biographic data \_\_\_\_\_

18. Using the same four-point scale, rate each of the following political topics in terms of their importance to you in the execution of your official duties.

- a. Foreign relations \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Multi-lateral organizations and issues \_\_\_\_\_
- c. National security affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- d. Internal political affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- e. Biographic data \_\_\_\_\_

STAT For the following five questions (19-23), we define RAW INTELLIGENCE as unevaluated reports received from a wide variety of sources including, for example, attaché cables, NSA reports, CIA Information Reports, Defense Intelligence Reports (IPs), State cables and FBIS reports. We define FINISHED INTELLIGENCE as everything else you received in written form from the Intelligence Community that contains evaluated information.

19. As an intelligence consumer, how often did you receive RAW INTELLIGENCE as a part of your input from the Intelligence Community? (Circle one.)

- a. Almost daily
- b. Weekly
- c. Less often than weekly

20. Listed below are examples of FINISHED INTELLIGENCE from the major intelligence producing organizations and a six-point scale corresponding to how often you used to read any publication of the type listed. Please enter a rating from 1 to 6 in the blank to the left of each publication.

- 1 = Always
- 2 = Often
- 3 = Occasionally
- 4 = Rarely
- 5 = Received but did not read.
- 6 = Did not receive

#### INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PUBLICATIONS

- \_\_\_\_\_ a. National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's), Interagency Intelligence Memoranda (IIM's), Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIE's) or Alert Memoranda.

#### CIA PUBLICATIONS

- \_\_\_\_\_ b. National Intelligence Daily (NID).
- \_\_\_\_\_ c. International Economic and Energy Weekly.
- \_\_\_\_\_ d. Other periodic reviews (e.g., Africa Review, Latin America Review, Western Europe Review, Strategic Intelligence Monthly Review, International Narcotics Review, VIP Quarterly Health Watch, etc.).
- \_\_\_\_\_ e. Intelligence Reports, Analyses, Assessments, Memoranda, or Handbooks.
- \_\_\_\_\_ f. Other CIA reports (Specify)\_\_\_\_\_.

DIA AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS

- \_\_\_\_\_ g. Defense Intelligence Summary (DIS).
- \_\_\_\_\_ h. Defense Intelligence Notices, Appraisals, and  
Warning Reports.
- \_\_\_\_\_ i. DIA Analytic Reports.
- \_\_\_\_\_ j. Scientific and Technical Reports (from FTD, FSTC,  
NISC, etc.)
- \_\_\_\_\_ k. Other DIA or Defense reports (Specify)\_\_\_\_\_.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATIONS

- \_\_\_\_\_ l. State Morning Summary.
- \_\_\_\_\_ m. INR Current Analyses and Situation Reports  
(Arab/Israeli Sit. Rep, Soviet Highlights, etc.).
- \_\_\_\_\_ n. INR Intelligence Reports.
- \_\_\_\_\_ o. INR Analyst Briefs.
- \_\_\_\_\_ p. Other State reports (Specify)\_\_\_\_\_.

NSA PUBLICATIONS

- \_\_\_\_\_ q. NSA SIGINT Summary
- \_\_\_\_\_ r. Daily Area Event Summaries (e.g., Middle East, Asian,  
African, Soviet EURCOM)
- \_\_\_\_\_ s. Periodic Summaries (e.g., International Trade and  
Finance, Energy, International Shipping, etc.)
- \_\_\_\_\_ t. Other NSA Reports (Specify)\_\_\_\_\_.

Using the scale provided below, rate the utility of each of the following kinds of information for carrying out your official duties.

- 1 = Extremely useful
- 2 = Fairly useful
- 3 = Not particularly useful
- 4 = Not useful at all
- 5 = Did not receive

- \_\_\_\_\_ a. Unevaluated or raw intelligence reports.
- \_\_\_\_\_ b. Current intelligence, including monitoring of events and reporting on daily developments in such periodicals as the NID, State Morning Summary, or DIA DIN.
- \_\_\_\_\_ c. Basic intelligence including compilation of factual data, order of battle information, and in-depth studies.
- \_\_\_\_\_ d. Predictive and analytic material, including estimates and memos.
- \_\_\_\_\_ e. Intelligence analysis directly related to policy options or that which supports operational planning.
- \_\_\_\_\_ f. Open source analysis or data from wire services, newspapers, periodicals, or academic research.

22. Using the scale provided below, rate the overall quality of each of the following kinds of information which you received.

- 1 = Excellent
- 2 = Good
- 3 = Fair
- 4 = Poor
- 5 = Did not receive

- \_\_\_\_\_ a. Unevaluated or raw intelligence reports.
- \_\_\_\_\_ b. Current intelligence.
- \_\_\_\_\_ c. Basic intelligence.
- \_\_\_\_\_ d. Predictive and analytic material.
- \_\_\_\_\_ e. Intelligence analysis directly related to policy options.
- \_\_\_\_\_ f. Open source analysis.

23. Using the four categories provided below, how would you best characterize the quantity of each of the following types of information which you received?

- 1 = Excessive
- 2 = Sufficient
- 3 = Insufficient
- 4 = Did not receive

- ☐ a. Unevaluated or raw intelligence reports.
- ☐ b. Current intelligence.
- ☐ c. Basic intelligence.
- ☐ d. Predictive and analytic material.
- ☐ e. Intelligence analysis directly related to policy options.
- ☐ f. Open source analysis.

24. Do you believe that you received all the relevant available intelligence on the areas and subjects you were interested in? (Circle one.)

- a. Always
- b. Mostly
- c. Sometimes
- d. Rarely
- e. Never

25. In general, how well did the Community respond to your requests for intelligence? (Circle one.)

- a. I was totally satisfied.
- b. I was generally satisfied.
- c. There was room for substantial improvement.
- d. I was completely dissatisfied with the community's responses to my requests for intelligence.
- e. Not applicable to me. I never explicitly requested intelligence from the Community.

26. To what degree do you believe intelligence provided a unique input to your overall knowledge of the areas in which you were interested? (Circle one.)

- a. Always
- b. Often
- c. Occasionally
- d. Rarely
- e. Never

27. Using the scale provided below, how would you rate the usefulness of the intelligence you received in each of the regions with which you worked? (See map on page 12)

- 1 = Indispensible
- 2 = Quite useful
- 3 = Not particularly useful
- 4 = Not at all useful

- ☐ a. Western Europe - NATO countries
- ☐ b. Soviet - European Communist countries
- ☐ b. Latin America
- ☐ c. Middle East - North Africa
- ☐ d. Sub-Saharan Africa
- ☐ e. Asia


28. Using the scale provided below, how would you rate the usefulness of the intelligence you received for each of the following topics with which you worked?

- 1 = Indispensible
- 2 = Quite useful
- 3 = Not particularly useful
- 4 = Not at all useful

- ☐ a. Political
- ☐ b. Economic
- ☐ c. Military
- ☐ d. Scientific/Technological
- ☐ e. Geographic/Societal
- ☐ f. Energy, including Nuclear
- ☐ g. Other (Specify) \_\_\_\_\_.

THE FOLLOWING QUESTION SHOULD BE ANSWERED ONLY BY THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHO HAD THIRD WORLD POLICY INTERESTS. If you did not have policy interests in any Third World countries, skip over question 29 and go directly to question 30 located on page 14.

*Reference Map for Questions 13, 27, and 29.*




29. For those individuals with Third World policy interests, additional detail is required because their needs for intelligence are very specific. Please complete the following matrix.

- a. First, estimate the percent of your time spent on each of these Third World countries. (If you had policy interests in more than 12 countries, please limit your responses to the 12 most important countries.)
- b. Second, estimate how adequate was the quantity of pertinent intelligence which you received for each of those countries. Use the following scale: 1 = Excessive; 2 = Just about right; 3 = Needed substantially more; 4 = Totally inadequate.
- c. Third, assess the overall quality of the intelligence which you received for each of those countries. Use the following scale: 1 = Excellent; 2 = Good; 3 = Satisfactory; 4 = Fair; 5 = Poor.

25X1

LATIN AMERICA



Peru  
Trinidad  
Venezuela  
Other (specify)

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Angola  
Ethiopia  
Ivory Coast  
Kenya  
Liberia  
Mozambique  
Namibia  
Nigeria  
Somalia  
South Africa  
Tanzania  
Zaire  
Zambia  
Zimbabwe

Other (specify) Approved For Release 2005/03/24 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001500050005-2

a.	b.	c.
Time	Vol	Qual

[illegible]

MIDDLE EAST &amp; NORTH AFRICA

[illegible]

## ASIA

Hong Kong  
India  
Indonesia  
Kampuchea  
Korea (North)  
Korea (South)  
Laos  
Malaysia  
Pakistan  
Philippines  
Singapore  
Taiwan  
Thailand  
Viet Nam

Other (specify):

a.	b.	c.
Time	Vol	Qual

[illegible]

25X1

25X1

30. When compared to intelligence I received on other areas, the intelligence I typically obtained on the Third World was: (Circle one.)

- a. Not as useful
- b. About equally useful
- c. More useful
- d. Cannot compare, I received only Third World intelligence.
- e. Cannot compare, I did not receive any Third World intelligence.

31. Follow-up interviews are planned for some of the respondents to this survey. Please indicate below your willingness or unwillingness to participate in this interview follow-up. (Circle one.)

- a. I would definitely like to be interviewed concerning my responses to this questionnaire or its general content.
- b. I would be willing to be interviewed concerning either my own responses or the general content of this questionnaire.
- c. I would not care to be interviewed.

The final four items are open-ended and ask for your suggestions and recommendations in written form. Please answer these questions on separate sheets of paper which should then be returned in the pre-addressed envelope together with the survey questionnaire itself. Please keep your answers UNCLASSIFIED. If you wish to pursue a classified matter, be sure you have circled alternative (a) or (b) to question 31, on the previous page.

#### SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

32. Suggest ways that the intelligence producers could improve the value and quality of their product.
33. Cite specific issues for which you felt the most pressing need for more or better intelligence. Cite the most important ones first. Be as specific as you can.
34. What, if any, of the intelligence that you received would you have been willing to trade-off (do without) in order to receive more or better information in another area?
35. The Intelligence Community has been cited by some policy makers as unresponsive to the needs of those whose official duties were primarily in the realm of the Third World. If you agree with this criticism, please provide details about problems that are country and topic specific, so that possible solutions might be developed.

STATE

Edmund Muskie	Secretary of State
Leon Billings	Executive Assistant
Peter Tarnoff	Executive Secretary
Warren Christopher	Dep Sec State
John Trattner	Executive Assistant
David D. Newsom*	Under Secretary State for Political Affairs
Richard N. Cooper*	Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
Matthew Nimetz	Und Sec State for Security Assistance S&T
Anthony Lake	Director Political Planning Staff
Paul H. Krtesberg*	---
Samuel R. Berger	Deputy Director Political Planning
Reginald Bartholomew	Dir/PM
George Churchill	PM/ISO
Thomas McNamara	PM/ISP
Robert Dyess	Asst Sec/Public Affairs
Pat Derian	Asst Sec Human Rights
Steve Palmer	---
Richard M. Moose	Asst Sec AF
Robert Houdek	Staff Dir. IG
William Bowdler	Asst Sec Inter Amer
Luigi Einaudi	Staff Dir IG

\*Interviewed in Pilot Study.

Richard Holbrooke	Asst Sec EAP
Dennis Harter*	---
Priscilla Clapp	Staff Dir IG
Hal Saunders	Asst Sec NE/SA Affairs
George Lambrakis	Staff Dir IG
Charles W. Maynes	Asst Sec IO
Gerald Helman	Dep Asst Sec IO/Multi- Lateral Affairs
Marian Creekmore	Dep Asst Sec Econ Dev Pol IO
Thomas Pickering	Asst Sec OES
Martha Falco	Asst Sec Intl Narcotics
George Vest	Asst Sec
Timothy Deal	Staff Dir IG
Amb Sol Linowitz	Special Rep/Pres
Charles Meissner	US Spec Negotiator for Econ Affairs
John Reinhardt	Director, ICA
Robert Hormats	Deputy STR

WHITE HOUSE/NSC

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski	Asst to Pres for NS Affairs
David Aaron	Deputy to Dr. Brzezinski
Henry Owen*	NSC Information Liaison
Rutherford Poats*	NSC Information Liaison
BGEN William Odom	Mil Asst to Dr. Brzezinski
MAJ Les Denend*	Mil Asst to Dr. Brzezinski
Jack Watson	NSC Staff
Fritz Ermarth	NSC Staff
Marshall Brement	NSC Staff
Donald Gregg	NSC Staff
Victor Utgoff	NSC Dir of Policy Analysis
Robert Molander	NSC Office of Global Issues
Robert Pastor	NSC Staff (LA)
MGEN Jasper Welch*	NSC Dir Defense Policy Cluster
Steve Larrabee	NSC Staff
Benjamin Huberman	NSC O/Sci Tech Policy
Denis Clift	Asst to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
Dr. Frank Press	D/Office of Sci & Tech Policy NSC
Hazel Denton*	North-South Relations Group

DEFENSE

Hon. Harold Brown	Sec. Def
BGEN Carl. R. Smith, USAF	Mil Asst Sec. Def
CAPT Robert Bovey, USN	Mil Asst Sec. Def ✓
Hon. W. Graham Claytor	Dep Sec Def
BGEN Colin Powell, USA	Mil Asst to Dep Sec Def
CAPT J. A. Baldwin, USN	Mil Asst to Dep Sec Def ✓
Robert W. Komer	Und Sec Def Policy
COL Harold Coyle, USAF	Mil Asst Und Sec Def
David E. McGiffert	Asst Sec ISA
Frank Kramer	Prin Dep, Asst Sec ISA
Nicoloas Platt	Dep Asst Sec ISA, E. Asia and Pacific
Robert H. Pelleteau, Jr.	Dep Asst Sec ISA, NE, AF and So. Asia
Henry H. Gaffney	Dir, NE, and So. Asia
Ellen Frost	Dep Asst Sec Econ & Tech Affairs
LTGEN Ernest Graves	Dep Asst Sec Security Assistance
Walter Slocombe	Dep Und Sec Policy Planning
Lynn Davis	Asst Dep Und Sec
MGEM Richard Boverie, USAF	Prin. Dir Plans & Policy
COL Michael K. Sheridan, USMC	Dir, Planning & Req. Policy
Sheila Buckley	Dir, Negotiations Policy

*Householder  
(14#)*

Daniel J. Murphy	Dep Under Sec Policy Review
Ronald H. Stivers	Asst Dep Under Sec Policy Review
Peter Oleson	Dir, Intel Policy
Andrew Marshall	Dir, Net Assessment
COL Frederick W. Geisler, USAF	Asst Dir
William J. Percy	Und Sec Def Research & Eng
Gerald P. Dineen	Under Sec Def C <sup>3</sup> I
Walter B. LaBerge	Prin Dep
Robert F. Trimble	Acting Dep Under Sec R&E
Harry L. VanTrees	Prin DASD C <sup>3</sup> I
Russell Murray	Asst Sec PA&E
Michael Leonard	Dep Asst Sec Regional Prog.
GEN David Jones, USAF	Chmn, JCS
COL Charles F. Stebbins, USAF	Exec Asst Chmn JCS
VADM Thor Hansen, USN	Dir, Joint Staff
MGEN Charles W. Dyke, USA	Vice Dir Joint Staff
LTGEN Philip C. Fast, USAF	J-3
BGEN Gerald E. McIlmoyle, USAF	Dep Dir J-3
COL J. M. Greer, USAF	Stat Ops
RADM T. C. Watson, Jr., USN	Dir, Current Ops
COL J. T. Callaghan, USAF	Joint Ops.
VADM K. J. Carroll, USN	J-4
BGEN E. Honor, USA	Dep Dir Planning and Research

LTGEN Paul Gorman, USA	J-5
RADM R. A. Paddock, USN	Vice Dir J-5
BGEN D. R. Palmer, USA	Dep Dir Pol. Mil. Affairs
BGEN Dale A. Vesser, USA	RDTJF Dir.
LTGEN Harry Griffith, USA	Dir Defense Nuclear Agency
RADM G. H. B. Schaeffer, USN	Dep Dir
Dr. Ed. W. Conrad	Dep Dir
LTGEN Gerald Post, USAF	Dir, Defense Logistics Agency
Clifford Alexander	Secretary of Army
Robert H. Spiro, Jr.	Dep Sec Army
COL Wallace Arnold	Exec Asst Sec Army
Percy A. Pierre	Asst Sec Army Research Dev and Acquisition
GEN E. C. Meyer	Army C/S
COL. J. H. Moellering, USA	Exec Army C/S <i>HH</i>
GEN John H. Vessey	VC/S Army
COL R. W. Eisenbarth, USA	Exec VC/S <i>HH</i>
LTGEN Arthur Gregg, USA	Dep C/S Army Log
MGEN R. H. Thompson, USA	Asst Dep C/S Army Log <i>✓ wrong title</i>
LTGEN G. K. Otis, USA	Dep C/S Army Ops & Plans
MGEN M. Brady	Asst Dep C/S Army Ops & Plans
GEN John R. Guthrie, USA	Commander, Mat Dev and Readiness Command
COL Carl Tipton, USA	Exec <i>✓</i> <i>house-holder</i>

MGEN Thomas F. Healy, USA	Commander, U.S. Army Sec. Amt Center
COL William D. Wilson, USA	C/S DRSAC
Edward Hidalgo	SECNAV
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JOINT RMS-DD/NFA USER SURVEY

Goal

Determine the degree to which intelligence was useful to the policy officers in the previous Administration and to collect the additional information necessary to assist Intelligence Community Program Managers in planning output and developing procedures. Or, stated another way, determine with as much precision as possible the degree of satisfaction among policy officers with the intelligence provided and obtain suggestions for modification in form, content, or timeliness.

Background

There have been a number of attempts over the years to obtain policy community appraisals of intelligence products in a manner that would help senior managers of intelligence production to do their job better. Generally, these efforts have had little impact either because they were fairly narrowly focused or because of the manner in which they they were designed and implemented. At least, in part because senior intelligence production managers have not been involved in the design and implementation of past user surveys, these officials have not found the results to be very persuasive.

A few months ago, the Resource Management Staff (RMS) began planning for a consumer survey with the limited objective of characterizing customer satisfaction on intelligence produced on the Third World. Subsequently, both the scope and the sponsorship of the project were broadened. The survey as now planned will be comprehensive in coverage, and--more important--the

sponsorship will include the production components of the Intelligence Community. Under the aegis of the Interagency Working Group on Intelligence Production, which reports to the DD/NFA, intelligence producers will participate directly in the design and implementation of the consumer survey. An ad hoc working group comprising representatives of Intelligence Community production elements and of RMS was organized to put together the attached draft survey.

The Office of Medical Services, Psychological Services Staff in CIA, has assisted in the technical aspects of constructing this survey. This Staff contains individuals with the professional training and experience to provide the required assistance. In addition, the Staff possesses a data processing capability that will facilitate analysis of the survey results.

#### Process or Method

As a cooperative effort between the Intelligence Community production elements and the Resource Management Staff, the Ad Hoc Working Group has:

- Structured a questionnaire that, when answered, should provide valuable and reliable insight into the usefulness of intelligence to the respondent, and,
- Compiled a list of policy officers in the Carter Administration that should be included in such a survey.

The Interagency Working Group on Intelligence Production will receive and review these documents. Then:

- Coordinate the questionnaire and list of participants with the Intelligence Community,
- Obtain DCI endorsement of the survey, and
- Distribute the questionnaire--probably via DCI letter of transmittal--asking that it be completed and returned by means of stamped, pre-addressed envelopes.

The Psychological Services Staff has agreed to:

- Process the completed questionnaires, and
- Prepare an initial summary tabulation of responses.

The Ad Hoc Working Group will then:

- Make an initial determination of who should be contacted for a follow-up interview, and
- Prepare an initial report to the Interagency Working Group on the survey results. This report will include recommendations regarding additional study and the nature of a final report.

The Interagency Working Group on Intelligence Production will then review

- The list of proposed follow-up interviews,
- The initial report, and
- Determine additional steps to be taken, particularly the nature of the final report.

#### Who Is To Be Surveyed

Officials of the Carter Administration were selected because they have lived through the trials of making decisions with or without sufficient information and these experiences should still be fresh in their minds. Many of these individuals should be willing to share their impressions with the Community. They need to be contacted soon, however, while their experiences are still fresh. The incoming Reagan Administration is still not yet fully in place nor has it established an operating pattern. Depending on the experience gained with the first survey, it might make sense to follow up with the new Administration after they have had the opportunity to work with the system for some time.

The list of about \_\_\_\_ policy officers proposed as participants in this survey has been compiled from contributions by CIA, NSA, DIA, and RMS.\* Additional people may be included in the survey at the request of an individual agency but their responses will be tabulated and analyzed as a subset of the main survey. In addition to the policy officers some key staffers will be added where we or the principal believes it would be beneficial. Selected respondents will be asked to participate in a follow-up interview if they indicate a willingness to do so.

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\*Policy officer has been defined in this survey to include officials down to and including deputy assistant secretaries or equivalent level.

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